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ARGUMENT

I.

Bowen Does Not Correctly Deal With The Established Facts Of The Case.

The bulk of Bowen's arguments are based on how Bowen views the evidence and
are often based on activities occurring since Bowen acquired the property in 2006 subsequently blocking (in 2008) the Judds' use of the Easement Area. Indeed, there are
many instances of total misstatement of the testimony presented at trial and
misstatements of what the Judds said in their opening brief.

The Court of Appeals

admonished Bowen about that kind of approach to the facts when it said:
Although the Bowens characterize the evidence regarding the Judds'
permissive use as undisputed and argue that, as a matter of law, that
evidence cannot support the court's adversity conclusion, the facts relied on
by the Bowens appear to simply be evidence culled from the record that
supports their own arguments, without acknowledging conflicting evidence
that the trial court's findings necessarily resolved. Pointing to the evidence
they believe supports their argument is insufficient to carry their "heavy
burden" of persuading us to "reverse under the deferential standard of
review" we afford to factual findings.
Judd v. Bowen, 2017 UT App 56 ,I 30, 397 P.3d 686 (App. 2017).

It is therefore not efficient or helpful to sift through all those selectively-noted
pieces of testimony allegedly favorable to Bowen because they do not consist of facts
supported by the Findings of Fact and Final Judgment entered by the trial court. They
likewise ignore the evidence which supports the trial court's Findings and Final
Judgment. However, to give a flavor of the lengths to which Bowen is willing to go to
try to support his arguments, a few of Bowen's claimed facts and misstated arguments are
cited below to show the serious misstatements of this case which are found in Bowen's
vJ

Opening Brief.
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1.

Bowen's Opening Brief alleges in some 28 places that their claimed facts

are "undisputed" on key points in the case. Such allegations are not only inaccurate, as
made clear by the trial court's Findings and the arguments contained in this Brief, but
also rely on Bowen's version of the facts without regard to the multitude of opposing
facts raised by the Judds. Moreover, for the most part, the trial court accepted the Judds'
version of the facts and rejected those contrary claims submitted by Bowen. As one
simple example, Bowen claims that Charles Allen testified there was other access to the
Judd Cabin outside the Easement Area. Bowen references testimony by Mr. Allen during
an exchange regarding parking within the Easement Area and access to the Judd Cabin.
(R. 1918:74.) Mr. Allen, in the testimony immediately prior thereto, stated that on at
least three separate occasions there was no other access to the Judd Cabin other than
using the Easement Area [described by the trial court in its Findings and Judgment as the
Circular Driveway].

(R. 1918:56, 59, 67, 70.)

witnesses provided similar testimony.

Aerial photographs and additional

For example, James Williams, a longtime

neighboring cabin owner who has visited the Judd Cabin since the 1940s, testified that
"it's [the Easement Area] the only way you could get out".

(R. 1918:81.) See also

testimony of Robert Judd who confirmed that there was "no road you can use on Judd
property to access". (R. 1918:97.) The trial court in its Findings ruled specifically that
there was no other access. (R. 1124:22, 25.)
2.

Bowen misstates the Judds' Opening Brief by claiming (without any

citation to specific language) that the Judds have argued for an historically-established
two-lane road. (Bowen Opening Brief, pp. 45-47.) Nowhere did the Judds' Opening
-2-
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Brief ever say that. The cited pages from the Judds' Opening Brief talk about the entire
area being available for parking, all without reference to any roads as such.
3.

At numerous places in his Opening Brief, Bowen incorrectly claims as

be_ing "undisputed" that any parking by the Judds on the Easement Area was only when
the Bowens were not present. (See, e.g., Bowen Opening Brief, pp. 15-16, 20-21.) This
is patently incorrect, as even confirmed by Bowen family members. For example, Robert
0j

Bowen, the brother of Respondent, testified at length about seeing Judd family members
and Judd vehicles in the Easement Area as he visited the Bowen Cabin starting in 1954
and extending to at least 2005. 1 Pauline Judd Johnson testified on her use since the 1930s
that there was never a time when the Bowens were parked in the Easement Area and the
Judds were not able to get in or out. (R. 1918:134-135.) The record is also replete with
additional testimony of Judd family members who testified about both Judd and Bowen

1

~

The Court is directed to the examination of Robert Bowen at R. 1920: 174-184.
Therein, Mr. Bowen, who was called to testify on behalf of his brother, David Bowen,
was asked about his visits to the Bowen Cabin from 1954 to at least 2005. (R. 1920:174175.) In those many visits, usually one or two weeks a year, he regularly saw Judd
family members and saw their cars parked in the Easement Area. (R. 1920:180, 182183.) He was friends with some of the Judd family members such that his kids and theirs
would play and go on hikes together when the kids were younger. (R. 1920: 176-177 .)
He saw users of the Judd Cabin parking in the Easement Area in different places.
(R. 1920:181.) "So if a car was parked ... on that north end or on the north side, we
might have to drive down the south side to get to the cabin." (R. 1920:184.) There were
"a couple of times" when he asked a Judd to move their cars. (R. 1920: 176.) However,
he was able to generally work around the many Judd vehicles which were there.
(R. 1920:177, 183-184.) Likewise, David Bowen's wife, Karen Bowen, testified that in
some 27 years of using the Bowen Cabin, she "didn't pay that much attention," but she
was "sure they [Judds] were there, I just didn't pay that much attention." (R. 1919: 135.)
She also had a personal friendship with Dru Clark, one of the Judd family members, and
"was over at her cabin a couple of times." (R. 1919:136.) She also observed Robert and
Linda Bowen going over and visiting with Carly Judd Hardy and saw their kids play
together. (R. 1919:137.).
-3-
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family members being present at the same time. 2 Also note the trial court's Findings that
prior to 2006 visitors to both cabins "amicably cooperated in accessing and parking in the
Easement Area." (R. 1123-24.)

C. Allen:
R. 1918:74 (cooperated in parking on circle); P. Johnson:
R. 1918:127, 135 (cooperated in parking on circle); R. Judd: R. 1918:94 (talking about
access and parking when both using circle at same time); C. Hardy: R. 1919:23-25; Ex.
18 (children would play together with L. Bowen's children at Brighton), R. 1919:24-25
(pointing out in photo, Ex. 18, children playing together in 2005); R. Judd: R. 1919:71
(played with Bowen kids at Brighton Cabin when younger); K. Bowen: R. 1919:102
(clarifying that she did not say Judds were not at the cabin the same time she was there,
but rather that she just did not see them); R. 1919:132, 136 (admitting the Judds could
have been at their cabin; she just did not pay attention); R. 1919:135 (admitting that she
was "sure they were there, I just didn't pay much attention"); R. 1919:110 (Dru Clark, a
Judd, came and talked to Karen at the Bowen cabin); R. 1919:123 (admitted she knew a
Judd car, which had been parked in the circle, rolled out of the circle and downhill into a
meadow); R. 1919:133 (said she knew Judd kids were there (during 1965-79) because
sometimes the Judd kids played with the Bowen kids together on elephant rock - Bowen
property); R. 1919:136 ("I was over at Dru's cabin a couple chimes"); R. 1919:137 (said
"I was not paying attention to who was at the Judd Cabin"); R. 1919: 13 7 (said Robert and
Linda Bowen were going over and visiting with Carlie and kids playing together); D.
Bowen: R. 1919:150 (the Judds would come over to Bowen Cabin and visit his
grandmother); R. 1919:157 (saw Judds parked on Judd property); R. 1919:160 (would
occasionally see Judd ~ar parked on Judd land west in front of their cabin, pre-1959);
R. 1919:166 (saw Judd car at Judd cabin); R. 1919:171 (saw Judd cars on east side of
meadow on Easement Area); R. 1919:197 (would see a Judd car on circle and ask them to
move, once or twice a year); R. Bowen: R. 1919:227 (said Judd parked in circle and he
asked them to move); B. Brunker: R. 1919:237 (said saw Judds parking by old door, by
fireplace, facing north); B. Bowen: R. 1920:125-126 (said it was possible Judds were
there; she played with Judd children on rocks, just didn't see them); R. Judd:
R. 1918:95 (observed Bowens park on edges of circle because had a little more space
than by their cabin); R. 1918:94 (when Bowens parked in circle while he was there, he
would "work around that"); R. 1918:95 (said Judds and Bowens accommodated each
other regarding parking in circle - when both parking at same time - under "unspoken
arrangement"); P. Johnson: R. 1918:129 (visited each other's cabins); R. 1918:124 (saw
people using Bowen cabin at same time as she used Judd cabin); D. Clark: R. 1918: 156
(observed Bowens park their different cars while she was there parked next to their
Bowen cabin); K. Bowen: R. 1919:110 (stated Dru recognized Karen's car from seeing
it at Brighton); R. 1919:110 (Dru, a Judd family member, came over to talk with Karen
Bowen).
2

-4-
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4.

Bowen also claims that the Judds always moved their vehicles when

visitors to the Bowen Cabin were present. (See Bowen Opening Brief, pp. 9-10, 16, 20,
26, 30, 31, 33-34, 36, 50, 52, 56.) Not only are these claims incorrect and unsupported
by the court's Findings, Bowen cannot point to any testimony that the two Judd family
members named as those who moved their cars at the request of Bowen on a minimal
number of occasions ever parked their cars outside the Easement Area. That is because,
other than the Easement Area, historically there was no other place to park. Indeed, the
only evidence on the question of a place to repark a car to accommodate a Bowen family
member came from Charles Allen. Mr. Allen testified that if he had been asked to move
his car (which was never the case in over 35 years of his use of the area prior to 2008), he
would have moved it to "[ a]nywhere else on the circle that was empty at the time, other
places that I had parked." (R. 1918:57.) He also confirmed he parked on the Easement
Area "every time, it was the only place to go.

There was nowh~re else to go."

(R. 1918:56.) This concept was confirmed by James Williams, a neighbor who visited
the area regularly starting in 1944. Mr. Williams said that when he visited the Judd
Cabin, he always parked in the Easement Area. "It's the only place you could park."
(R. 1918:82.) In summary, Judd witnesses testified that they were asked a total of five

times to move a car in the circle. Excluding David Bowen, the other Bowen witnesses
testified that they asked Judds to move their cars a total of five times. Several of their
requests were duplicates of the Judds' witnesses.

David Bowen testified that he

-5-
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occasionally asked them to move a car, but he also inconsistently testified elsewhere that
he never saw a Judd car park on the circle. 3
In other words, the Judd witnesses testified that from the early 1940s up to 2008
on perhaps a total of five occasions they were requested to move a car. Similarly, the

~

Bowen witnesses, excluding David Bowen4, report making some five requests to move
cars, with many if not all of those requests being duplicates of the Judd witnesses'
testimony. But no witness ever testified that when a Judd moved a car, it was to a place
outside of the Easement Area. As made clear by the unrebutted testimony, even as to

3

To be specific, the trial record provides the following additional unrebutted
testimony: James Williams, a friend of the Judd family who visited the property in
question from 1944 to the present, testified he was never asked to move a car.
(R. 1918:82.) Charles Allen, a Judd family member, used the property from 1971 to the
present. He testified th~t he was never asked to move a car. (R. 1921:10.) Robert Judd,
who used the property from the 1950s to 2008, was never asked to move a car. Pauline
Johnson, also a Judd, used the property from 1928 to beyond 2008. She testified that she
was asked once by David Bowen's brother, Ross, to move a car. (R. 1918: 135.) It is not
clear when that request occurred. Nor was she asked to what place she moved her car.
Dru Clark, a Judd, who used the property from 1959 to 2008, testified that she was
asked perhaps four or five times to move her car. (R. 1918:192.) Again, there is no clear
indication which requests were made to Dru Clark nor the place to where she moved her
vehicle. No other Judd witnesses testified they were asked to move a vehicle. Brittany
Bowen, a Bowen witness, testified she asked Pauline Judd to move once prior to 2008,
never asked anyone else. (R. 1920:166.) Robert Bowen, another Bowen witness, asked
the Judds to move a couple of times. (R. 1920: 176.) David Bowen, who visited the
Bowen Cabin from 1940, testified he occasionally asked a Judd to move their car.
(R. 1919:167, 171.) Bowen's testimony, which is often internally contradictory, says his
requests for Judds to move their cars started after 1995. (R. 1919: 196.) Karen Bowen
testified that from 1996 to 2018, only two to three times during that period did she
observe her husband, David, ask a Judd to move a car. (R. 1919:106.) Except as noted,
no other Judd or Bowen witness testified of asking others to move a car.
4
Mr. Bowen testified that he always asked the Judds to move their cars, but he
also inconsistently testified elsewhere that he never saw a Judd car park in the Easement
Area from the 1940s to 2006. (R. 1919:194-95.)
-6-
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those cars moved, the Judds would simply park on another spot on the Easement Area
because there was no other place to park. 5
5.

The claim by Bowen that the Judds used the Easement Area only 95% of

the time is taken completely out of context. The true testimony is that they used the
Easement Area 100% of the time but perhaps only 95% of the time would they drive
around the entire Easement Area. Thus, Robert Judd said that cars used "the entire
circular driveway to enter and exit the property" 95% of the time (emphasis added).
(R. 1918:90-91.) Dru Clark made this even more clear when she said, in response to the
~

question about cars going "all the way around the circular drive way to enter or exit," that
vehicles did that "hundred percent of the time to exit unless maybe somebody was parked
here and then I would back up." (R. 1918:155.) (See C. Allen, R. 1918:56 (didn't have
to go all around the circle every time).) One also needs to reference back to the multitude
of witnesses who said they accessed the Judd Cabin by using the Easement Area every
time they visited the Judd Cabin. 6

5

See footnote 5 to the Judd Opening Brief. See also C. Allen R. 1918:58 (so we
had nowhere else); P. Johnson (R. 1918:118) (stated would historically park on the
circle).
6
C. Allen: R. 1918:56 ([Used] "every time, it was the only place to go. There
was nowhere else to go."), 63-64 (observed "constant usage" of Easement Area since
1971); R. Judd: R. 1918:89 (verified historic use from 1960s), 90, 91 (use of driveway
involved use of "entire" driveway, going all the way around 95% of the time); J.
Williams: R. 1918:78 (verified use of circle in the mid-1940 era); P. Johnson:
R. 1918:103, 119-120 (regularly parked on driveway from 1935 and use has been
constant and continuous since mid-1930s); D. Clark: R. 1918:150 (parking observation
started in late '50s or early '60s); C. Hardy: R. 1919:6, 20 (confirmed parking from late
'50s); L. Hawkins: R. 1919:35-36, 39-40 (confirmed parking from early '60s, used
circle every time); L. Jess: R. 1919:44, 46-47 (parked in Easement Area every time she
visited, verified from 1978); K. Harlan: R. 1919:50, 53-54 (verified parking from
-7-
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6.

Bowen completely miscites an alleged stipulation of the parties to claim as

an "undisputed" fact that the beginning of the prescriptive period was not triggered until
2008. (Bowen Opening Brief, p. 17.) To do so, Bowen completely twists the exchange
between counsel and the court as found at R. 1920:20-22. The testimony there had to do
with a_ heated discussion in 2008 between Bowen and a member of the Judd family by the
name of Scott Livingston. The specific language of any stipulation, referred to only in an
abbreviated form by Bowen at page 17 of his Opening Brief and in his footnotes 11, 15,
and 24, is as follows: [By Mr. Nelson] "I'll stipulate that 2008 was the first time that
they [the Bowens] felt they were put on notice of any adversity verbally." (R. 1920:20.)

Mr. Nelson goes on to explain that such a confrontation did not change all the testimony
of adverse use "from early 1900 to the start of 2008." (R. 1920:21.) Thus, the stipulation
was "that in 2008 was the first time they heard us with some verbal statement (inaudible)
actions, we claim some claim of right at the earliest." (R. 1920:21.) As Mr. Nelson
explained to the court, the verbal exchange in 2008 does not change in any way all the
G&,

open and notorious use of the Easement Area for over 7 5 years, which the trial court
found to have given full notice of adverse use to the Bowens. (R. 1920:21-22.)
7.

This Court should decline Bowen's suggestion for this Court to review the

LiDAR video of the property in question created shortly before trial. After the LiDAR
video was presented to the trial court and testimony disputing and questioning its
accuracy was presented, the trial court declared that, in light of all the issues surrounding
the accuracy of the LiD!IB- video, a personal inspection of the property by the trial judge

1976); S. Judd: R. 1919:58, 60 (during large gatherings, lots of cars all parked in the
circle), 61 (parked in Easement Area "every time"; verified since mid-1960s).
-8Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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without any party being present was necessary and that she would make a personal
inspection of the property, which she did. (R. 1920-21.) Aside from the fact that it is the
trial court's role to making the findings, which findings are not easily disturbed or
~

overturned on appeal, it must also be emphasized that the trial court considered the video
prpblematic, noting the testimony by Charles Allen of numerous examples where the
video misrepresented the area used by the Judds. (R. 1921:18-20.)
8.

Strangely enough, Bowen objects to the Judds putting in their Opening

Brief as Addendum D trial exhibit no. 2. This exhibit, which was admitted into evidence,
was in fact actually created by Bowen's own surveyor expert. (R. 1920:205 (surveyor
Stahl testifying that he created exhibit no. 2. ). ) Hence, any criticism by Bowen of the
exhibit is to be directed to Bowen's own expert witness.
10.

Bowen relies several times on the 1912 case of Bolton v. Murphy, 41 Utah

591, 127 P. 335 (1912), to assert that the Judds are limited to the use made of the
easement in the immediately-preceding 20 years.

Bowen, however, fails to note the

much more recent case of Pitt v. Taron, 2009 UT App. 113, 210 P.3d 962 {App. 2009),
which states: "[T]he trial court erred in stating that the use had to be for 'the last twenty
years,' ... the required showing in a prescriptive easement case is that the use in question
be continuous 'for a period of twenty years,' which need not be the last twenty years."
Id. at 3. Nevertheless, the use made of the Easement Area by the Judds from 1988 to
{ii

2008 has been established in the record as consistent with earlier usage.

-9Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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II.

The Judds Met All The Requirements For Proving A Prescriptive Easement.

Many, if not most, access/use easements are granted by virtue of a \Vritten
document which is recorded to document the intention of the parties. However, there are
many cases where historic and long-term use of another's property is not documented in
writing. In such cases, courts have upheld the existence of various non-written easements
(or ownership) where it is obvious that the parties intended for an easement or continued
usage to exist (i.e., "easements by necessity", "boundary by acquiescence", "adverse
possession", "prescriptive easements", etc.). A prescriptive easement isn't so much about
depriving a landowner of his rights as it is about preserving the rights of long-term users
of property and in pres~rving the status quo. Prescriptive easements are reasonable and
practical areas of common law that merely confirm what parties have intended for many
years through their conduct. As observed by the court of appeals:
[T]he doctrine of prescriptive easement was designed to give legal sanction
to property arrangements that have existed peacefully, openly, continuously
and without objection for the prescriptive period. In this manner, the court
seeks to prevent the very thing that has happened in this case, that is, a
dispute after several decades of amicable use.
Homer v. Smith, 866 P.2d 622, 628 (App. 1993).
Utah courts have always recognized the doctrine of prescriptive easements, and
there is substantial case law discussing the elements of easements by prescription.
Elements of a prescriptive easement were first set forth in case law over a century ago.
See Harkness v. Woodniansee, 7 Utah 227, 26 P. 291 (1891). Multiple subsequent cases
have confirmed such elements.

-10-
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The trial court, in its Conclusions of Law in this case, carefully reviewed the four
elements essential to constitute a prescriptive easement and, as to each, specifically found
the Judds had established their easements by clear and convincing evidence.

Those

elements are noted as follows:
To establish a prescriptive easement, a party must show, "by clear and
convincing evidence," that its use of the area in question has been
"(l) open, (2) notorious, (3) adverse, and (4) continuous for at least 20
years." (Citations omitted.)

Van Denburgh v. Sweeney Land Co., 2013 UT App 265,315 P.3d 1058, 1060.
To prevent the prescriptive easement from arising, the owner of the servient
estate then has the burden of establishing that the use was initially
permissive.

Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305,311 (1998). See, also, Martinez v. Wells, 2004 UT
App 43, 88 P.3d 343, 347 (App. 2004).
Many court decisions over the years have clarified the elements, requirements,
burdens of proof, and status of prescriptive easements. Such requirements have received
the following clarifications by Utah appellate courts:

A.

"Open" Requirement.

That the easement in question in this matter is "open" is obvious. Anyone visiting
the two cabin areas can see the Easement Area and observe the uses made of such area.
The trial court found that the Easement Area was always visible and that Bowen knew of
its existence at the time he acquired title to the Bowen Cabin property in 2006. (R. 1121,
Findings ,I 6, R. 1123, Findings ,I 29.)7

1

C. Allen: R. 1918:63 (roadway visible to users of Judd and Bowen cabins since
1971); P. Johnson: R. 1918:119 (driveway "apparent" and "hard to miss" since 1930s).
-11~
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B.

"Notorious" Requirement.
~

The notoriety requirement was shown by clear and convincing evidence because
Bowen and his predecessors had actual notice of the Judds' use of the Easement Area.
The requirement that the use must be "notorious" is explained as follows:

It is true indeed that the use must have been such that it is plainly
apparent that the claimant is asserting a right so the servient owner either
knows or should know that his property is being so used.
Richins v. Struhs, 17 Utah 2d 356, 412 P.2d 314, 316 (1966).
As confirmed by .the trial court, the Judds' usage of the Easement Area has always
been "notorious". (R. 1127, Conclusions of Law 17.)
C.

"Adverse" Requirement.

At trial, the Judds proved by clear and convincing evidence that they fulfilled the
requirement of adverse use of Bowen's property.

Giil

[O]nce a claimant has shown an open and continuous use of the land under
claim of right for the twenty-year prescriptive period, the use will be
presumed to have been adverse.
~

Valcarce at 311. See Van Denburgh at 1061. See, also, Martinez at 34 7.
A "claim of right" is defined in Martinez as "without first obtaining permission".

Id. at 347.
'The prevailing rule is that where a claimant has shown an open,
visible, continuous, and unmolested use of land for the period of time
sufficient to acquire an easement by adverse user, the use will be presumed
to be under a claim of right.'

Zollinger v.Frank,110 Utah 514, 175 P.2d 714, 716 (1946).
If the use is in fact adverse and appears to be so, that is all that is required.
Even though it is sometimes referred to as a hostile use, it is not necessary
that there be any open hostility manifest in the use of force or any overt
-12-
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physical or verbal opposition if the condition just stated is met. It is not the
policy of the law to encourage violence by rewarding it; and it generally
does not make the protection or the acquisition of rights dependent upon it.
(Citation omitted.)

Richins at 316.
At trial, the Judds established continual use of the Easement Area since the 1930s.
The Easement Area was open and visible at all times, and Bowen was aware of such
usage of the Easement Area at the time he acquired title to the property in 2006.
(R. 1123:31.) As a result, the requirement of "adverse" use was established. To be clear,

each element under the "adverse" requirement will be discussed below.
As indicated above, the "adverse" element can fail if the owner of a servient land
can prove that the original use of the easement area was "permissive". See Martinez at
34 7. In this regard, Bowen claims that the Judds' usage of the Easement Area for years
was not adverse and merely amounted to "neighborly accommodation" - somehow being
tantamount to "permission" - thus negating the "adverse" element of prescriptive
easements. However, and based upon the evidence provided at trial, the trial court in this
case properly found that Bowen had not supplied any evidence that the use was "initially
permissive" (or at any other time). (R. 1121 1 5.)
In that regard, it should be noted that no consent or permission was ever sought by
the Judds for use of the prescriptive easement. 8 No consent or permission was ever
0J
8

C. Allen: R. 1918:63-64 (never asked Bowen for permission to use Easement
Area ~r park cars on it, and Bowen never gave permission); J. Williams: R. 1918:82 (no
one ever told him he couldn't park in circle or objected to him parking there); R. Judd:
R. 1918:92 (never asked Bowen for permission to use Easement Area and Bowen never
gave permission); P. Johnson: R. 1918: 117 (she or parents never asked permission from
anyone in Bowen cabin to use or park on Easement Area, and they never told her that
-13Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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granted. No objection was ever made by Bowen property owners to such use. The trial
court found that the historic, friendly, harmonious, and cooperative use of Bowen's
property did not constitute "permission".

(R. 1127, Conclusions 15.)

Such a result

comports with prior case law on this issue.

~

The fact that the parties (predecessors) were friendly, or even cordial with
each other, as they appear to have been, does not prevent a prescriptive
.right from coming into being.
Richins at 316.

This court has affirmed findings of adverse use and, thus, prescriptive right
in other cases in which the former landowners displayed "neighborliness."
Although each of these factual situations involved acts of neighborly
accommodation and cordial relations, we nevertheless upheld the adverse
presumption in the absence of sufficient proof that the use was initially
permissive. As we stated in Richins, the fact that the parties were initially
friendly or cordial with one another does not prevent a prescriptive right
from arising. (Citations omitted.)
Valcarce at 312.

In a case similar to the instant case, the court stated:
In addition, the trial court compared the facts of this case to those in
Richins v. Struhs. Struhs involved two adjoining landowners whose sole
they were giving her permission to use or park on Easement Area), 138 (no specific
arrangement allowing parking or driving on Easement Area); D. Clark: R. 1918:157 (no
discussions with Bowens about parking on driveway; they never gave permission to her
or anyone else to use or park on driveway and she never asked permission; never heard
anyone else ask for permission or give anyone else permission), R. 1919:20-21 (never
asked Bowen for permission to park on Easement Area and Bowens never came to her or
anyone else to give permission; never any discussions about parking); L. Hawkins:
R. 1919:38-39 (Bowens never gave her permission to park on or use Easement Area and
she never asked permission); L. Jess: R. 1919:45-46 (Bowens never gave her permission
to park on or use Easement Area and she never asked permission); K. Harlan:
R. 1919:54 (Bowens never gave her permission to park on or use Easement Area and she
never asked permission); S. Judd: R. 1919:62 (Bowens never gave her permission to
park on or use Easement Area and she never asked permission), 64 (not aware of any
written or verbal permission to park in middle of easement).
-14-
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~

Gib

access to their respective properties was a common driveway, which their
predecessors built together and maintained and used cooperatively for more
than forty years. Upon purchasing one of the properties, the Struhs "caused
a survey to be made and thereafter erected a fence in the driveway on what
they assert[ed was] the true boundary," thereby blocking the Richins'
access to their property. The Struhs court held that the parties' (and their
predecessors') cooperative use of the shared driveway for more than the
prescriptive period was such that Richins "ha[d] established a prescriptive
right to continue to so use it." The trial court in the instant case stated that,
"[l]ike the adjoining property owners in Struhs, the Witts and McNaughtens
established and harmoniously used a common lane from the 1930's through
at least the mid-1970's." Thus, according the to the trial court, this
harmonious use established a prescriptive right in favor of Lunt as a matter
of law. (Citations omitted.)
Lunt v. Lance, 2008 UT App 192, 186 P .3d 978, 985 (App. 2008).

~

~

The trial court appears to have been of the opinion that because the
Whipples and the Joneses were relatives and that they used the driveway
harmoniously and without conflict, that the use was permissive and that
therefore no prescriptive right to use the driveway arose. The difficulty
with this view is that it does not give effect to fundamental principles
applicable to prescriptive rights.
The origin and purpose of their
recognition arises out of the general policy of the law of assuring the peace
and good order of society by leaving a long established status quo at rest
rather than by disturbing it. In order to serve this purpose, when a claimant
has shown that such a use has existed peaceably and without interference
for the prescriptive period of 20 years, the law presumes that the use is
adverse to the owner; and that it had a legitimate origin. (Citations
omitted.)
Richins at 315.

Finally, it must be noted that Bowen did not acquire title to the Bowen Cabin
property until 2006, and his prior usage of the property was, as he himself admitted,
sporadic and occasional.

Therefore, he is in no position to testify as to historic

permissive use.
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D.

"Continuous" Requirement.

The Judds' use of the Easement Area was continuous because there was clear and
convincing evidence presented at trial that the Judds used the Easement Area every time
they needed it and their use was uninterrupted for many decades.
To satisfy the requirement of "continuous" use, the use does not need to be every
day. No more usage is required than is necessary to satisfy this requirement.
"A use need not be 'regular' or 'constant' in order to be 'continuous'. All
that is necessary is that the use be as often as required by the nature of the
use and the needs of the claimant." ( Citation omitted.)

Johnson v. Higley, 1999 UT 278, 989 P.2d 61, 68 (App. 1999).
A way may be established by prescription without direct evidence of its
actual use during each year. A use may be continuous though not constant.
A right of way means a right to pass over another's land, more or less
frequently, according to the nature of the use to be made by the easement;
and how frequently is immaterial, provided it occurred as often as the
claimant had occasion or chose to pass.

Richards v. Pines Ranch, Inc., 559 P.2d 948, 949 (1977).
The evidence established at trial was that Judd Cabin users used the Easement
Area and parking areas every time the Judd Cabin was visited since the 1930s. (R. 112425, Findings~~ 19, 25, 26, 27, 31.)
The claim by Bowen that the Judd Cabin users never used the Easement Area
when Bowen was at the Bowen Cabin has been thoroughly discussed above, all of which
completely refutes Bowen's claim in this regard.
Presumably, Bowen's assertion goes to the "permission" argument or the
"continuity" argument. However, the trial court heard ample evidence that the Easement

-16-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Area was used virtually every time Judd Cabin users visited the Judd Cabin - both when
Bowen (or his predecessors) were present and when they were not.
Remembering the historic mutual cooperation of the parties and that there really
was nowhere else to park, Bowen produced minimal testimony at trial that cars were ever
asked to be relocated (to other locations on the Easement Area) so that they were not
blocking the Easement Area. The Judds' testimony was that in 75 years of usage, such a
request was rarely made. (See fn. infra.) Since cabin users generally parked on the edges
and in the middle of the Easement Area before Bowen changed that arrangement to park
after 2008, the temporary parking arrangement of the Judds worked well.

III.

This Court Should Give Deference To The Trial Court Findings.
In Lunt v. Lance, the Utah Court of Appeals, quoting from Valcarce at 311, noted

the standard for the review of a trial court's findings concerning prescriptive easements:
A trial court's decision that clear and convincing evidence was presented is
reviewed by the appellate courts for clear error, "notwithstanding the clear
and convincing standard of proof below." And, while the conclusion that a
prescriptive easement exists is a question of law, it is so fact-dependent that
trial courts are generally accorded "a broad measure of discretion when
applying the conect legal standard to the given set of facts" and are only
overturned if the trial court's decision was in excess of this broad
discretion. (Citations omitted.)

~

Lunt v. Lance at 983.
The trial court Findings in this case are not to be ignored simply because Bowen
likes other testimony which the trial court considered but obviously rejected.

IV.

Utah Law Implies That A Prescriptive Easement For Parking Is Cognizable.
In Utah, a prescriptive easement arises when the "use of another's land [is] open,

continuous, and adverse under a claim of right for a period of twenty years." Valcarce at
-17-
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311. These elements do not preclude a prescriptive easement for parking. Rather, these
elements are compatible with creating a prescriptive easement for both access and
parking. For one thing,. "use of another's land" is not restricted to access and could also
encompass parking. The situation we have in this case is that the Judds openly and
continuously used the Bowen land for access and parking purposes without permission
for much more than 20 years.
A transitory easement for parking is very much in keeping with the transitory
nature of prescriptive easements in general.

Moreover, in all cases of prescriptive

easements for access, during the time the holder of the easement right is passing over the
subservient land, that property is fully occupied for the duration of the passage.
However, the passage is only transitory. Likewise, a transitory easement for parking
means that people have a right to park on a sporadic, and not permanent, basis without a
right to any set or reserved parking spot. The right permits the use of so much of the
parking area as is necessary and is available at a given time, while allowing the owner of
the subservient property to have a passageway to access their buildings and park as well.
The language cited by Bowen to oppose such an easement speaks in terms of
permanent structures and denial of use of the land to the owner of the subservient
property such as to equate to adverse possession. For example, Bowen quotes the case of
Nyman v. Anchor Development, L.L.C., 2003 UT 27, ,r18, 73 P.3d 357 (2003), to the

effect that broader rights associated with "outright ownership" and "right[ s] to permanent
exclusive occupancy" cannot be obtained prescriptively. However, the order granted by
the trial court with regard to parking did not create a situation of adverse possession. To
-18-
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the contrary, the trial judge made it clear that the area needed to be restored to its historic
size to allow easy passage and parking of multiple vehicles by both the Judds and the
Bowens and that mutual cooperation was to be the rule. Such parking might be on the
edges of the Easement Area or perhaps in the center, all of which was done historically.
But the trial court order did require conditions of the Easement Area to be restored to
where they were prior to 2008 to avoid any issue of blockage.
V.

Bowen's Objection To A Parking Easement Is Based On The False Premise
That Bowens Were Historically Denied Access To Their Property.

The underlying premise upon which Bowen argues against a prescriptive parking
easement is the erroneous claim that the Bowens were denied use of their property, thus
turning the parking easement into something more like adverse possession. Bowen can
only get to this argument by, once again, misconstruing the nature of the Easement Area
and trying to limit it to a narrow, single-lane road when, in fact, the historic use allowed
access and parking of many vehicles visiting both cabins without restricting access to and
0,

from either cabin. Indeed, at no time during the many years of its historical use was the
use of the Easement Area by the Judds an obstruction to the Bowens from also using and
parking on the Easement Area. Bowen does not and indeed cannot cite to any Findings
by the trial court which would support a claim that the Judds' parking created an
obstruction to the Bowens' use of their property. In fact, as noted above, Robert Bowen

vii

often saw Judd vehicles in the Easement Area and simply worked around them.
However, if a Judd car was blocking passage, that car was moved to another place on the
Easement Area.

As the trial court noted, the parties cooperated in parking their

~

respective vehicles. (R. 1123 :32-33.)
-19l.{jJ
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The testimony a~d the trial court's Findings, along with the aerial photographs
admitted into evidence, establish that the historical parking at various places within and
around the Easement Area, including parking on the edges and in the center of the
Easement Area, did not block vehicular access. Historically, Bowen Cabin users parked
immediately adjacent to the Bowen Cabin (off the Easement Area) but recently changed
that situation by now parking on the Easement Area - effectively blocking Judd Cabin
users from use of the Easement Area. (R. 1124:23, 24.) The lower court ordered both
parties to refrain from blocking either party's usage of the Easement Area. (R. 1127111;
R. 13161 12.) These historic parking spaces by Bowen (adjacent to his cabin) were later
converted into a walking path, at which time Bowen began parking his vehicles on the
Easement Area. 9 This· change in Bowen's parking obstructed the access and parking
historically used by Judd Cabin users.
The testimony also recounts numerous incidents where members of the Bowen
and Judd families visited their respective cabins at the same time. Thus, historically the
Bowens and the Judds could all use the Easement Area without issues. The kinds of
burdens on the Bowen property being suggested by Bowen are not found in the record.
A transitory easement for parking means that the Judds have a right to park on the
Easement Area when visiting the Judd Cabin, on the basis that there is no set or reserved
parking spot, and to have a passageway to get to their cabin. Visitors to the Judd Cabin
R. Bowen: R: 1920:175 ("We parked right next to the [Bowen Cabin]."); B.
Brunker: R. 1919:235, 241 (would park by the [Bowen] cabin door); R. Judd:
R. 1918:94 (Bowens had more space by their cabin where they parked); D. Clark:
R. 1918:156 ("They parked beside their cabin); C. Hardy: R. 1919:32 (identified
photograph of trial exhibit "21" showing Bowen car parked in their space next to Bowen
Cabin).
9
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~

might park around the edges of the Easement Area or perhaps in the center. That parking
leaves open the passageway for all other vehicles. In this regard, the trial court did order
both parties to accommodate each other in this whole process. That does not mean they
had to move to some place other than the Easement Area to park, but rather find
accommodation within the Easement Area.
It is true that after the Bowens put up their roadblocks commencing around 2008,
the Judds were forced to find a limited number of other places to park, which they had to
carve out themselves. But that was not what they had used historically. The Judds
should not be penalized for trying to make adjustments during the pendency of the
litigation. What the Bowens did after 2008 has no direct bearing on the creation of the
easement historically.
~

VI.

There Is Precedence For A Prescriptive Parking Easement.
Bowen asserts that a parking easement cannot be obtained through prescription

and that only "access" can be obtained under that concept of law. He argues that no Utah
case has previously allowed a prescriptive "parking" easement. The Court of Appeals, in
this appeal, noted that prescriptive parking is obtainable, just not in this situation.
Gb

As discussed in the Judd Opening Brief, at least two prior Utah cases dealt with
the issue of prescriptive parking easements as such easements relate to temporary
pa!king. However, in Buckley v. Cox, 122 Utah 151, 247 P.2d 277 (1952), the case was
decided against the plaintiff by the Utah Supreme Court solely for the legal reason that
the parking use in such case was deemed to be permissive and not adverse. In Lunt v.
Kitchens, 123 Utah 488, 260 P.2d 535 (1953), the Utah Supreme Court reversed the
-21-
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district court on the grounds that the use had not, in fact, existed for the requisite 20-year
period. Such appellate rulings did not indicate that a prescriptive easement for parking is
not available. They only decided that in those instances the easement was not established
by necessary facts at trial.
The two Utah cases cited above demonstrate that a right to transitory parking can
be established through a prescriptive easement. Logically, there appears no practical
reason why temporary parking use of another's property should not be allowed as a
prescriptive easement - as long as the requisite elements to establish a prescriptive
easement have been met.
Bowen observes that this Court earlier refused to allow the prescriptive easement
concept to apply to a permanent garage structure used by a neighbor. See Nyman. Such a
conclusion does not challenge the parking easement at issue in this case. Temporary
parking usage is totally different than erecting a permanent structure (a garage) and
claiming a prescriptive easement for such structure.
In a lengthy footnote in their Opening Brief, the Judds cited many cases from
courts in other states which expressly granted a prescriptive easement for parking
purposes. To be added to that list is the recent decision of Lutz v. Bauman, No. 15 MISC
000351 (HPS), 2017 WL 3754823, at *8 (Mass. Land Ct. Aug. 29, 2017), judgment
entered, No. 15 MISC. 000351 (HPS), 2017 WL 3866259 (Mass. Land Ct. Aug. 29,
20.17). In that case, the court held that the plaintiff's use of a concrete pad for parking for
over 20 years was sufficient to acquire a prescriptive easement for parking because there
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(Ev

w~s no exclusivity related to the parking and all of the other elements of proving a

Gb
prescriptive easement were met.
It is clear that Utah law, and the law of other states, allows for the acquisition of a

prescriptive easement for parking purposes - provided the elements necessary to
constitute such an easement are met.

Such a conclusion makes sense.

It would be

inconsistent for the law to allow transitory access usage under a prescriptive easement but
~

not allow intermittent parking under the same concept of law.
VII.

The Judds Seek Only To Maintain Their Parking Usage That Has Existed
For Over 75 Years.
Bowen erroneously claims that the Judds seek to enlarge their right to parking.

That is not the case. The testimony from many witnesses was that the parking on the
Easement Area has remained the same over the many years of use. The trial judge in her
supplemental rulings did not enlarge the Judds' historical use but only responded to
Bowen's refusal to comply with her original order.
VIII. Alternate Access Or Parking Options Do Not Negate A Prescriptive
Easement.
Bowen also seems to be arguing the proposition that alternate access and parking
options to the property created long after the historical use had been established negates

in whole or in part the Judds' rights to establish, or continue to use, a prescriptive
easement. As discussed in detail above, for decades (and continuing through 2008 when
the dispute arose) there was no other way to access the Judd Cabin or to temporarily park
except on the Easement Area.

-23-
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Alternate access, if it exists, has never been used as an excuse under Utah law to
prevent establishment of a prescriptive easement.

Establishment of a prescriptive ·

easement requires compliance with the four elements and does not create an exception in
cases where the easement user has other access. To require otherwise would tum this
legal concept into an "easement-only-if-necessary" case.
IX.

The Easement Area Was Adequately Described In The Historical Aerial
.Photographs And Testimony Of The Trial Witnesses.
As made clear in.the Findings and Judgment of the trial court, the historical aerial

photographs, as supported by the testimony of trial witnesses, define the Easement Area.
(R. 1315

~

6.) As a result, the trial court ordered Bowen to cut back recently-grown

vegetation that limited the Judds' historic use of the Easement Area. The important thing
to note is that access to the Judd Cabin was made by using the Easement Area to enter,
park, and thereafter leave the Easement Area, all without having to back up the dirt road
leading to the Easement Area, and which allowed reasonable parking in areas that did not
block passage through the Easement Area.
CONCLUSION
This Court should reaffirm the trial court's conclusion that the Judds have a
prescriptive easement over the Bowen property for both access and parking. Having
determined that the Judds demonstrated, by clear and convincing evidence, the existence
of decades of historical use and that they met all the elements of a prescriptive easement,
the trial court's ruling should be upheld by this Court. Bowen has failed to marshal the
evidence relied upon by the trial court that supports the Judds' position, instead stressing
only the evidence supporting his claims and which existed mostly following his
-24-
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~

acquisition of the Bowen Cabin property in 2006.

Bowen's arguments have largely

ignored the historic uses existing for approximately 75 years prior to such time. Without
the use of the easement, as confirmed by the trial court, the Judds are effectively without
access to their cabin which has been enjoyed by such family since the early l 900s.
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